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COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
UNDER THE NORTH DAKOTA RULES
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*
RULES 13 THROUGH 16
Among the most interesting innovations made by the new North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure' are the new provisions regarding
counterclaims and third-party practice. While these provisions are
best understood when placed in the context of a number of other
rules relating to joinder of parties and claims, they are themselves
of sufficient importance to warrant close consideration.
Counterclaims are regulated by the provisions of Rule 13, which
reads as follows:
RULE 13. COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM
2
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the plead-
ing the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudica-
tion the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot ac-
quire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so stated
if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the
subject of another pending action.3
(b) Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a
counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim.4
(c) Counterclaim Exceeding or Less Than Opposing Claim.
(1) A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat
the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that
sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
5
(2) In an action upon contract for the recovery of money
only, when the defendant by his answer shall not deny the
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Previous papers in this series are Crum, The Proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure, 32 N.Dak.L.Rev. 88 (1956); Ibid, 33 N.Dak.L.Rev. 41 (1957); Crum,
Summary of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 N.Dak.L.Rev. 287 (1957)
(a short and non-technical treatment of major provisions). Out-of-state readers are advised
that the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure became effective by order of the Supreme
Court of North Dakota on July 1, 1957.
2. This rule supersedes N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0714 (1943) (dealing with counterclaims).
It is substantially identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 with the exceptions noted in footnotes
6, 7, and 11.
3. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (a).
4. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P, 13 (b).
5. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (c) (1).
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plaintiff's claim but shall set up a counterclaim amounting
to less than the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiff may have judg-
ment as upon default for the excess of his claim over such
counterclaim. In such case, the plaintiff shall file with the
clerk of the court a statement admitting such counterclaim,
which statement shall become a part of the judgment roll.6
(d) Counterclaim Against the State. These rules shall not
be construed to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed by law
the right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against
the State of North Dakota or an officer or agency thereof.,
(e) Counterclaim Maturing or Acquired After Pleading.
A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader
after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental plead-
ing."
(f) Omitted Counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up
a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court
set up the counterclaim by amendment. 9
(g) Cross Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counter-claim there-
in or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the
party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant. 1°
(h) Additional Parties May Be Brought In. When the pre-
sence of parties other than those to the original action is re-
quired for the granting of complete relief in the determination
of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them
to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules,
if jurisdiction of them can be obtained. 1
(i) Separate Trials; Separate Judgments. If the court
orders separate trials as provided in Rule 42 (b), judgment
on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accord-
ance with the terms of Rule 54 (b) when the* court has juris-
diction so to do, even if the claims of the opposing party have
been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
12
6. This preserves N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0907 (1943). No comparable provision is
found in the Federal Rules.
7. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. .13 (d)," with the exception that "State of
North Dakota" has been substituted for "United States."
8. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (e).
9. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (f).
10. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (g).
11. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 (h), except that it omits the following clause
found at the end of the Federal Rule: "and their joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction of the action."
12. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(i).
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RULE 13 PLACED IN CONTEXT
The significance of Rule 13 becomes most apparent when it is
considered as part of a group 9f rules which includes Rules .14,
18, 19, 20, and 42.13 These rules, which were warmly debated at
the time of their inclusion in the federal procedure, 14 have the
general effect of permitting a greatly increased flexibility in the
joinder of claims and parties. Underlying their specific provisions,
it is believed, are three general principles of modern procedural
law.
1"
The first of these is that where a plaintiff and a defendant in
a given civil action have more than a single dispute which requires
adjustment, the resolution of all claims as between the parties ought
to be permitted in a single proceeding at the option of either party.
In pursuance of this principle, Rules 13 and 18 accordingly permit
absolutely unlimited joinder of claims and counterclaims in com-
plaint and answer. It should be added, however, that the right
thus granted'to unite claims in a pleading does not necessarily mean
a union of such claims for trial in a single hearing follows auto-
matically; Rule 42 makes this latter question one essentially for
the sound judicial discretion of the court.'6
The second principle is that of completeness .of adjudication
with regard to the subject matter of an action. 7 The rules imple-
13. These rules cover the topics of third-party practice, joinder of claims and remedies
(Rule 18), Necessary and Permissive joinder of parties (Rules 19 and 20), and the
consolidation or separation of actions for trial (Rule 42).
14. A majority of practitioners present at a well-known conference held in Cleveland
in 1938 to discuss the newly-adopted Federal Rules actually voted against the principle
of inlimited joinder of claims found in Rules 13 and 18. See Tabulation of Questionnaires,
13 U.Cin.L.Rev. 149 (1939). For the reported discussion, see Symposium, New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1, 57-59 (1939).
15. It is interesting to compare the principles said to underlie English judicial reforms.
These have been summarized as follows:
"1. The principle of unified jurisdiction.
2. The principle of unified procedure.
3. The principle of judicial control over procedure.
4. The prihciple of completely settling the controversy in one proceeding:
(1) Parties.
(2) Causes of Action.
(3) Counterclaims.
(4) Third Parties.
5. The principle that the action shall proceed by short and direct steps." Blume,
Free Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Counterclaims, 2 F.R.D. 250 (1953).
16. Rule 42 (b) permits a court to order a separate trial or hearing of any claim
"in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." This provision was inserted for
obvious reasons, primarily to obviate the danger the unlimited joinder principle be
deemed to permit an unrestricted battle royal.
17. "The new rules of procedure are designed to enable the disposition of a whole
controversy such as this at one time and in one action, provided all parties can be brought
before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any of the
parties." United States v. American Surety Co., 25 F.Supp. 700, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
"The compulsory counterclaim device is, of course, only a means of bringing all logically
related claims into a single litigation, through the penalty of precluding the later assertion
of omitted claims." Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corporation, 144 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir.
1944); see also Kuenzel v. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co., 29 F.Supp. 407
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ment this principle by providing in effect that whenever a given
transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,
comes before a court for adjudication of claims arising as between
the parties, all claims which exist between the parties to the action
with regard to the happenings pleaded shall be resolved as com-
pletely as possible."8 This means that when any portion of a trans-
action or occurrence is pleaded to the court as the basis of a
claim, the entire transaction or occurrence is thereby automatically
placed in issue' as between the parties.1 9
*The third principle is that whenever a transaction or occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences, involving numerous parties
comes before the court the claims of all parties involved should be
resolvable in a single proceeding so far as it is possible to gain
jurisdiction of all the parties. This principle explains the reason
for the existence of numerous procedural devices embodied in the
new Rules.2
0
The great justification for these principles is simply that they
are convenient from the standpoint of the administration of justice.
2 1
Under the new rules it is often possible for one action to do the
work which formerly required several, thereby saving both time
and court costs to judges, attorneys, litigants and witnesses. The
total effect of the Rules in this field has been summarized by one
writer in the statement the rules abandon (1) all restrictions on
joinder of actions and use of counterclaims where the parties are
the same; (2) all restrictions on joinder of defenses; (3) all re-
strictions on joinder of actions and counterclaims which involve
different parties except one, namely that they must all arise from
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and
occurrences and involve a common question of law or fact.
2
2
(E.D.Pa. 1939); 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 778, n. 10 (1950);
3 Moore's Federal Practice 27-36 (2d ed. 1948).
18. The question of what is comprehended within a single claim is often a knotty and
difficult one. The subject is treated at length in Restatement, Judgments §§ 61-67 (1942).
19. It is to be noted that this means that issues tendered by pleadings under the nsew
rules will often be much broader than the face of the pleadings themselves. The law :s
that a plaintiff who pleads only a part or portion of the claims he possesses arising from
a given transaction or occurrence has split his cause of action and thereby waived the
unpleaded aspects of his case. Buchanan v. General Motors Corporation, 158 F.2d 728
(2d Cir. 1947); Cleveland v. Higgins, 148 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1945). Similarly, a
defendant is compelled to plead all of his claims arising from the transaction or occur-
rence which is the subject matter of the plaintiff's action under the terms of Rule 13 (a)
under precisely the same penalty of waiver.
20. It explains for example, why Rule 14 permits third party practice, why Rule 13 (g)
permits a party to file a cross-claim against a co-party, why Rule 20 permits a joinder of
plaintiffs and defendants both jointly, severally, and in the alternative, and why
Rule 42 (a) permits the court to order the consolidation of actions involving common
questions of law and fact.
21. Sunderland, New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 U.Cin.L.Rev. 58 (1939).
22. Ibid.
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THE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
Rule 13 (A) is new to the procedure of this state and practitioners
are advised to take careful note of it. The rule carries out the
second principle of procedure enumerated in the preceding section
by providing, in effect, that with certain exceptions whenever any
portion of a transaction or occurrence is pleaded to a court in
support of a claim, the adverse party must present. to the court
in his responsive pleading all claims which he possesses with regard
to the same transaction or occurrence.2 3 Failure to do so constitutes
a waiver of the unpleaded claim and the right to bring a later
action on it is thereby lost.
24
The new rule is based on principles of res judicata.2 ' Failure to
plead a compulsory counterclaim is the equivalent of a judgment
by the court adverse to the claim as it might have been presented.
2
6
In view of the sweeping character of the rule it has been wisely
pointed out that if a practitioner is in any doubt concerning the
nature of his counterclaim, i.e., whether permissive or compulsory,
sound practice indicates the counterclaim should be pleaded in
order to protect the client's interest.*- It has been said that one
test for determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory is
whether the same evidence will support or refute the opposing
claim,'2  but this statement appears very doubtful. The majority
view seems to be that a counterclaim will be regarded as springing
from the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
.of the opposing party's claim (and hence compulsory) if a "logical
relationship" exists between them; 9 and it has been declared by
23. Gallahar v. George A. Rheman Co., 50 F.Supp. 655 (N.D.Ga. 1943); Pennsylvania
Ry. v. Musante-Phillips, Inc., 42 F.Supp. 340 (N.D.Cal. 1941); Thierfeld v. Postman's
Fifth Avenue Corporation, 37 F.Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
24. Numerous cases announce this rule as dicta. Square holdings are Reconstruction.
Finance Corporation v. First National Bank, 17 F.R.D. 397 (D.Wyo. 1955) (plaintiff held
barred from maintining action where opportunity to plead claim of fraud and conspiracy
had not been utilized in prior action); Kreitmeyer v. Baldwin Drainage District, 2 F.Supp.
208 (S.D.Fla. 1932), aff'd sub nom., 68 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1934) (Federal Equity Rule
30 applied to bar subsequent action on previously unpressed counterclaim). Cf. cases
cited note 19, supra.
25. Restatement, Judgments § 58 (1942), and comment f thereto (Supp. 1948); 1
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 794 (1950); 3 Moore's Federal Practice
28 (2d ed. 1948).
26. Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 115 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1940);
Gallahar v. George A. Rheman Co., 50 F.Supp. 655 (N.D.Ga. 1943); Pennsylvania Ry. v.
Musante-Phillips, Inc., 42 F.Supp. 340 (N.D.Cal. 1941); Thierfeld v. Postman's Fifth Ave.
Corp., 37 F.Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
27. 3 Moore's Federal Practice 38 (2d ed. 1948):
28. Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211 (D.C. 1940).
29. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). Examples of situ-
ations where a "logical relationship" has been found to exist include the leading case of
Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corporation, 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944) (in action on
promissory note, counterclaim that plaintiff and additional parties had obtained
note through fraudulent conspiracy was compulsory); John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal Nat-
ional Bank 124 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1942) (in action on promissory note, counterclaim fr
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the United States Supreme Court that a counterclaim may readily
be compulsory even though it embraces additional allegations of
fact, since the "facts relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever,
are in all particulars, the same as those constituting the defendant's
counterclaim."30
The question of how close or direct this "logical relationship"
between claim and counterclaim must be in order to require classi-
fication of the counterclaim as compulsory is one of degree. It
must be determined by the practitioner in planning his case
through the exercise of sound professional judgment as well as*
reliance upon precedent. In the federal courts it should be observed
that there appears to be a distinct tendency to hold that a counter-
claim is compulsory once it has been pleaded, and an equally dis-
tinct tendency amounting almost to reluctance to rule that
unpleaded counterclaims are necessarily barred thereafter.3 The
explanation for this ambivalent tendency is found in the circum-
stance that an extraneous factor complicates the position of the
federal courts. If a counterclaim is held to be permissive by the
federal courts, then it automatically requires an independent ground
of federal jurisdiction to support it or it must be dismissed .1 2 On
the other hand, if the federal court holds a counterclaim to be
compulsory it is at once entitled to the protection of the rule that
the federal courts automatically possess ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims; hence it is not subject to dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.13 Thus, once a counterclaim has been pleaded
in the federal courts, it serves the objective of obtaining complete-
ness of adjudication for the court .to rule it compulsory. The some-
usury is mandatory); Thierfeld v. Postman's Fifth Avenue Corporation, 37 F.Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (action for trade-mark infringement; counterclaim for cancellation of
trade-mark registration held compulsory). See note 31, infra.
30. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
31. Examination of the cases reveals that many of them contain dicta to the effect that
an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim is barred thereafter, but only a limited number
actually apply the rule to bar a subsequent action. The cases cited in note 24 are among
the few actually applying the rule to defeat a later action. Compare such cases as Big Cola
Corporation v. World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1943); Williams v. Robinson,
1 F.R.D. 211 (D.C. 1940), with such cases as Thierfeld v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp.,
37 F.Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The Big Cola case is a fine illustration of the reluctance
of the federal courts to apply the compulsory counterclaim rule in such a fashion as to
actually cut off a substantial right possessed by a party. The plaintiff sued to cancel a
contract on grounds of lack of mutuality. Defendant, to refute this claim, introduced evi-
dence showing that pursuant to the contract it had expended a great deal of money :n
promotion and advertising, but made no counterclaim for the reasonable value of these
services to the plaintiff in the event the contract was held invalid. The court ruled that the
counterclaim was not compulsory, holding in effect that a quasi-contract claim for the
value of goods and services furnished under a contract is not a compulsory counterclaim
to an action to declare the contract invalid. The precedents cited in support of this propo-
sition were cases decided long before the adoption of the Federal Rules, and in the light
of Rule 13 (a) the result seems almost indefensible.
32. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 392 (1950).
33. Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corporation, 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
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times troublesome issue of jurisdiction is thereby removed from
the case. But at the same time, to hold as a retroactive matter that
a counterclaim not asserted in a previous action was compulsory-
and thus barred by failure to plead it in time-prevents the court
from attaining precisely this same objective of completeness in its
disposition of the case. In such instances the party has lost a right
to plead a claim through the operation of a purely technical rule.
Hence in the federal compulsory counterclaim cases the scope
the courts afford Rule 13 (a) appears to vary somewhat in the
context of the factual situation presented and the objective toward
which the court is working. It is perhaps not too much to suggest
that in state courts where the peculiar problems of federal juris-
diction are not present the compulsory counterclaim rule may
receive a somewhat narrower interpretation than the federal courts,.
for thoroughly constructive purposes, have been inclined to give it.
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS
Under the former Code provisions, permissive counterclaims were
allowed in only two situations: (a) where a counterclaim arose from
the transaction or contract set forth in the plaintiff's complaint or
was connected with the subject of the action; (b) in cases where
the plaintiff's cause of action was founded on contract, any other
cause of action also stemming from contract and existing at the
commencement of the action might be pleaded as a counterclaim."a
These restrictions have been eliminated entirely by Rule 13 (b),
which allows a defendant to bring into an action all disputes of
any character which exist between himself and an adverse party."5
There is no requirement that a permissive counterclaim be related
in any fashion, logically or otherwise, to any claim put forward by
a plaintiff." The right of a defendant to join counterclaims in an
answer is thus precisely equivalent to the right of a plaintiff "jo
join claims in a complaint1
7
DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMS
The essential distinction between counterclaims and cross-claims
should be kept clearly in mind. Cross-claims arise solely between
co-parties in a case, whereas counterclaims arise between parties
34. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0714 (1943).
35. Following the principle of settling all causes in dispute between the parties in a
single proceeding, it has even been held a plaintiff may file a counterclaim to a defendant's
counterclaim. Warren v. Indian Refining Co., 30 F.Supp. 281 (N.D.Ind. 1939).
36. "All restrictions on the right to plead counterclaims have been removed." 3 Moore's
Federal Practice 50 (2d ed. 1948).
37. N.D.R.Civ.P. 18 (a).
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on opposing sides. Thus,-if A sues B and C as joint defendants in
a tort action, B's claim against A for damages arising from the
tort is a counterclaim. B's claim against C for contribution on the
theory C is a joint tort-feasor with him is a cross-claim. It is " o
be noted that whereas a permissive counterclaim may tender to
the court matters which are completely unrelated to the plaintiff's
case, cross-claims are limited to those claims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that
is the subject matter of the original action. s
VENUE PROBLEMS
A serious problem, so far unsettled, which deserves thoughtful
consideration in connection with Rule 13 is that of venue. The
North Dakota Rules provide that they are not to be construed to
"extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district court of North
Dakota or the venue of actions therein,"'' . thereby adopting for
use in this state a similar provision found in the Federal Rules.
4 0
This means that prior Code provisions relating to venue are left
completely untouched by the new Rules." But since the Code
provisions were framed to apply to a judicial system wherein the
right to bring counterclaims was far more restricted than is now
the case, it creates a distinct question of the applicability of exist-
ing statutes regarding venue to cases arising under the Rules.
To illustrate the difficulty is simple. Assume that A sues B in
the district court of Grand Forks County to recover damages for a
breach of contract to convey land-a transitory action. B, in turn,
files a counterclaim against A seeking to recover damages for an
injury to the real property in question, the property being located
in Burleigh county. The Code provides that actions to recover for
injuries to real property must be brought in the county wherein
the property is situated.4" Is A entitled to insist that B's counter-
claim be dismissed on the ground it can only be adjudicated by
the district court in Burleigh county? If B's counterclaim is treated
as compulsory it will be observed that the Rules oblige him "-o
plead it on penalty of waiver; a holding by the court that the
counterclaim is nevertheless not maintainable presents a distinct
anomaly. If B's counterclaim is treated as permissive, however,
38. N.D.R.Civ.P. 13 (g).
39. N.D.R.Civ.P. 82.
40:, Fed.R.Civ.P. 82.
41. The general chapter dealing with venue is N.D. Rev. Code c. 28-04' (1943).
42. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0401 (1943).
[VOL. 34
1958] COUNTERCLAIMS AND THUID-PARTY PRACTICE 15
and if a permissive counterclaim is regarded as being substantially
an independent action, then the argument that the venue statutes
are applicable to it possesses a very considerable degree of force.4
3
This is particularly true in the light of the recent holding of the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson44 to the effect
that the statutory restrictions as to place of trial of actions involving
real property pertain not merely to venue but also to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Similar questions exist with regard to other provisions of the
venue statutes. Could a counterclaim for partition of real property
or the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property be brought out-
side the county where the land is located in the face of the pro-
visions of N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0401 (1943)?4 Could a counter-
claim to recover on an insurance policy covering damage to prop-
erty be brought outside the county where the property was located
at the time of loss or damage in the face of N.D. Rev. Code
§ 28-0402 (1943)? 411 In view of the provisions of § 28-0403 of ihe
Revised Code of 1943, could a counterclaim for recovery of a
penalty imposed by statute be adjudicated outside the
county where the cause arose?4, What about counterclaims against
the Bank of North Dakota?48
Problems of this identical character have been much discussed'
in writings involving the Federal Rules. 49 In general, however,
43. See Farmer v. Dakin, 28 N.D. 452, 149 N.W. 354 (1914) (in action on promissory
note, counterclaim for ejectment, trespass to realty, and forcible entry and detainer with
respect to land situated in Minnesota would not lie). See 28 N.Dak.L.Rev. 320 (1952),
strongly criticizing the rule that the venue of actions to recover for trespass to realty is local
on the ground the "practical result of the rule . . . allows the defendant to escape liability
for his tortious conduct merely by crossing a state line." The rule was strongly' criticized
as early as 1811 by Justice Marshall in the well-known case of Livingston v. Jefferson,
Fed.Cas. 4,811 (1811), an action of trespass q.c.f. brought against Thomas Jefferson;
but Marshall felt himself bound to follow precedent and accordingly enforced the rule in
such a fashion as to defeat the action.
44. Not yet reported, opinion filed December 9, 1957.
45. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0401 (1943): "An action for any one of the following causes
must be brought in the county in which the subject matter . . . is situated . . . (3) For
the partition of real property; and (4) For the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real prop-
erty."
46. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0402 (1943): "An action for any one of the following causes
shall be tried in the county in which the subject of the action . . . is situated . . . (2)
For recovery on a policy of insurance for loss or damage to the property insured, and such
property at the time of its loss or damage shall be deemed the subject matter of such action."
47. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0403 (1943): "An action for any one of the following causes
shall be tried in the county where the cause . . . arose . . . (1) For the recovery of a
penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute . .
48. N.D. Rev. Code § 6-0927 (1943): "Such action shall be brought . . . in the county
where the Bank of North Dakota shall have its principal place of business, except as pro-
vided in sections 28-0401, 28-0402, 28-0403, 28-0404, and 28-0406." Note the provision
of Rule 13 (d) in connection with this question.
49. See Holtzoff, Some Problems Under Federal Third-Party Practice, 3 La.L.Rev. 408,
416-19 (1943) (taking view that questions of venue are substantially settled when the
action is brought); Willis, Five Years of Federal Third-Party Practice, 29 Va.L.Rev. 981,
1005-09 (1943) (taking opposite view); Gregory, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and
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despite the limiting provisions of Rule 82, the federal courts have
proceeded in most instances upon the theory that if the venue of
the action as brought by the plaintiff in the first instance is proper,
the requirements of the venue provisions of the Judicial Code are
satisfied; and thereafter a plaintiff cannot object on grounds of
improper venue to a permissive counterclaim,"° or to a compulsory
counterclaim even though it brings in new parties.5 Professor
Moore states that a third-party plaintiff cannot object on grounds
of venue to a counterclaim interposed by a third-party defendant,
but adds that the original plaintiff may have ground for objection
because "he has not hailed the third-party defendant into court."
He adds, however, that on balance even this objection should not
be valid because the cross-claim or counterclaim of the third-party





On the assumption that the adoption of the Federal Rules in
North Dakota also implied an adoption of the construction the
federal courts have placed on these rules, it is probably to be
expected that the court will ultimately hold that if the venue of
an action is properly laid in the first instance the requirements
of the venue statute have been satisfied; 53 but this stateme'nt can be
made only reservedly in the case of the real, as opposed to transi-
tory, actions.
Somewhat different considerations apply to venue in conhection
with Rule 14 (third-party practice) and it is discussed herein-
after."
COUNTERCLAIMS IN ACTIONS WITHIN FAMILY UNIT
Passing mention should also be made of the problems posed by
actions between husbands and wives and parents and children.
Cross-Claims as Affected by Venue Statutes of Kentucky, 43 Ky.L.J. 275 (1954); Ohlinger,
Jurisdiction, Venue and Process as to Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims, 6 Fed.Bar J.
420 (1945); Ohlinger, Problems of Jurisdiction and Venue, 26 Corn.L.Q. 240 (1941); and
see Willis, supra, at n. 82 of his discussion for a listing of many other writings.
50. "The setting up of a counterclaim against one already in a court of hFs own choosing
is very different, in respect to venue, from hailing him into that court." General Electric
Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
51. Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944). This decision has
been sharply criticized. See Ohlinger, Jurisdiction, Venue and Process as to Counterclaims
and Third-Party Claims, 6 Fed.Bar.J. 420, 428, n. 52 (1945).
52. 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 1332 (2d ed. 1948).
53. Cf. Dillage v. Lincoln Nat.L.Ins. Co., 54 N.D. 312, 209 N.W. 656 (1926). In
Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 977 (2d Cir. 1944), Judge Clark stated
with reference to the problem of venue as to counterclaims and cross-claims: "In this status
of the precedents, we think that the problem is new and not controlled by precedents,
which may not be held to do more than emphasize the necessity of a very close interrelation-
ship of the original and the ancillary proceedings. We are, therefore, justified in relying
on the literal terms of the venue statute, which in effect emphasizes the same thing by ap-
plying only to a civil suit commenced by original process." (Emphasis supplied).
54. See pp. 26 et seq.
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At common law, of course, the legal unity of husband and wife
resulted in a disability which prevented suits against one another.. 5
In FitzMaurice v. FitzMaurice,5 after examining the North Da-
kota statutes,5 7 the Supreme Court held that a wife might maintain
an action against her husband in this state for injuries caused by
his negligence. The question whether the husband might sue the
wife, however, was expressly left open.5" This might well lead to a
unique situation sometimes encountered in other jurisdictions: in
the event a wife sued her husband, it is possible, though scarcely
probable, that the court might rule that the husband was unable
to file a permissive or even a compulsory counterclaim, the common
law disabilities of coverture still persisting in his case." Note that
this result would also preclude a cross-claim between a husband
and wife suing or being sued as co-parties.
Of course it is always possible the court might rule that a wife
has waived her immunity from legal action on the part of her
spouse by bringing an action against him, and sustain a counter-
claim on that basis,60 though ordinarily the incidents of the marital
status are beyond waiver. But the best solution for the entire prob-
lem is plainly to be found in either a square holding that a hus-
husband's right to sue his wife is equal to the wife's right to sue him
or in a legislative amendment to the statute setting the doubt
at rest.6
55. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
56. 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932).
57. The statute involved was N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0705 (1943): "The wife after
marriage has with respect to property, contracts, and torts the same capacity and rights
and is subject to the same liabilities as before marriage . . ." Note that the statute,
read in literal terms, does nothing with regard to the disabilities coverture imposed upon
a husband at common law.
58. The court stated that the statute recognizes the wife's "legal individuality and
preserves for her every right that she had prior to her marriage. As to whether it does like-
wise for her husband we are not now required to and do not decide." FitzMaurice v. Fitz-
Maurice, 62 N.D. 191, 201, 242 N.W. 526, 529 (1932).
59. In Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949), the North Carolina
court ruled a husband could not sue his wife under the local statutes even though in
Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), it had been held a wife might
sue her husband. In Waite v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926), the Wisconsin
court held a wife might sue her husband; but in Fehr v. General Accident Fire & L. Ins.
Co., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944), a husband's action against his wife's insurer
(under a Wisconsin "direct action" statute) to recover for injuries caused by her negligence
was held barred by the common law disabilities of coverture. The statutes in both cases
bore a marked resemblance to those of this state.
60. This is the theory often used with regard to a plaintiff's attempt to assert a venue
statute in regard to a defendant's counterclaim. See the material on venue in the preceding
section.
61. Of course there are insurance aspects lurking in the background of most actions for
negligent injury as between spouses, as the case of Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life
Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944), makes manifest. It is nevertheless sub-
mitted that logically the statutory provisions permitting a husband and wife to make con-
tracts with one another, N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0706 (1943), as well as N.D. Rev. Code
§ 14-0705 (1943), almost compel the conclusion the husband may sue the wife; for
otherwise the husband would be given a right without remedy. See N.D. Const. Art. I,
§ 22.
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What has been said about suits between husbands and wives
also applies to actions between parents and children. These were
not permitted at common law as a matter of preserving harmony
in the family. No statute or holding appears to confer a right of
action between parent and child in this jurisdiction, so far as the
writer's research has disclosed; and the implications of this in
the field of counterclaims and cross-claims should be manifest.
RULE 14. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE "
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any
time after commencement of the action a defendant as a
third-party plaintiff may cause to be served a summons and
complaint upon a person not a party' to the action who is or
may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him. The person so served, hereinafter
called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to
the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his
counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims
against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13.
The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's
claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject-matter of the plaintiffs claim against the
third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant shall
assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counter-
claims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may
move for severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-
party claim; and the court may direct a final judgment upon
either the original claim or the third-party claim alone in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 54 (b). A third-party
defendant may proceed under this rule against any person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-
party defendant.
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a
counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a
third-party to be brought in under circumstances which under
this rule Would entitle a defendant to do so.
(c) Service. A copy of the third-party summons and com-
plaint shall be served iipon all parties or their attorneys.
62. This rule supersedes no North Dakota statute.
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FEDERAL AND
NORTH DAKOTA RULE
While Rule 14 is basically patterned after the Federal model,
it nevertheless contains one or two differences of minor character.
Whereas the impleading of a third-party defendant in a federal
proceeding is permissible only if the court in its discretion grants
leave to do so, 6 3 third-party defendants may be impleaded under
the language of the North Dakota Rules as a matter of right. 4
Moreover, although in the Federal C6urts the right to implead a
third-party defendant may be lost by unreasonable delay, 65 the
North Dakota Rules provide that the impleader may occur "at
any time."
Although the element of judicial discretion in connection with
third-party practice is accordingly somewhat more limited than it is
in the Federal courts, a substantial amount of discretion would
seem to persist because of the provisions of Rule 42, which is
plainly applicable to third-party proceedings and authorizes the
court to hold separate trials of third-party proceedings "in further-
ance of convenience or to avoid prejudice.""
OPERATION AND PURPOSE OF THE RULE
The framers of the Federal Rules derived Rule 14 from English
procedures .17 It is admittedly an innovation of sorts, though analo-
gies have been drawn between proceedings under the Rule and
early common law practice.s The situations wherein Rule 14 per-
mits a third-party defendant to be impleaded normally arise in
cases where A sues B, who in turn asserts that C is liable to him,
B, on a theory of either (a) contribution, '19 (b) indemnity, 0  or
63. General Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F.2d 671 (D.C.App. 1940); Baltimore & 0.
By. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1947).
64. Proposals to make impleader a matter of right in the federal courts have been n ade
from time to time, e.g., Holtzoff, supra note 49, at 413, but have never been accepted.
65. Union Nat. Bank v. Superior Steel Corp., 9 F.R.D. 128 (W.D.Pa. 1949) (iwo-year
delay); United States v. Shuman, 1 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. \V.Va. 1940) (eight months after
answer filed); Hessian Hills Corp. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 743 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) (delay of "many months" held laches barring right of impleader).
66. Thus, where unreasonable delay in impleading a third-party defendant has occurred,
there seems no reason why a court'might not simply order a separate trial of the third-party
proceeding as a matter of convenience under Rule 42 (h).
67. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules to Rule 14.
68. Thus, Professor Moore compares it with the early common law practice of "vouching
to warranty." 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 14.02 (2d ed. 1948).
69. Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Rappa v. Pittston
Stevedoring Corp., 48 F.Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 29 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.W.Va. 1939).
70. Brady v. Black Diamond Steamship Co., 45 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Watkins
v. Baltimore & 0. By. 29 F.Supp. 700 (W.D.Pa. 1939).
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(c) reimbursement. 7 ' These three headings comprehend numer-
ous types of fact situations,7 2 and some idea of what is possible
may be gleaned from the following outline by a noted commen-
tator:
Under (Rule 14) a surety may bring in-his principal, a lessee
sued by a lessor on a covenant may bring in his sublessee; a
covenantor, sued for breach of warranty of title may bring in
his own covenantor; a city sued for injury caused by a defec-
tive sidewalk may bring in an abutting owner, a contractor
sued for a wrongful act of a sub-contractor may bring in the
latter; a joint obligor who owes contribution may be brought
in, and a joint tort feasor may be brought in if there is con-
tribution. 7 :
It is fundamental under the rule that a defendant who wishes as
a third-party plaintiff to implead a third-party defendant must base
his third-party claim upon the plaintiff's original claim, in effect
carrying it forward and restating it on his own behalf against the
third-party defendant.7 4 Where the third-party claim is not pre-
dicated upon the plaintiff's original claim, it is not maintainable.
7 5
To illustrate, it has been held that a surety who has been sued by
a creditor of his principal cannot implead all other creditors of the
principal as third-party defendants and require them to file all of
their claims against the surety in a single action, since the third-
party defendants in such a case are manifestly not liable to the
defendant for any part of the original plaintiff's claim.7"
The fact a change in the legal characteristics and nature of the
claim asserted by the plaintiff occurs when it is restated against a
third-party defendant does not mean that the Rule becomes inappli-
cable. For example, an acceleration of liability may occur without
preventing the application of the rule, as in a case where a contract
of reimbursement provides that reimbursement is to be made only-
after rendition of a judgment against the person to be reimbursed;
in such situations, the person obligated to make reimbursement may
71. Hubshman v. Radco, Inc., 71 F.Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Balcoff v. Teagarden,
36 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Saunders v. Goldstein, 30 F.Supp. 150 (D.C. 1939);
Yap v. Ferguson, 8 F.R.D. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); U.S. v. Jollimore, 2 F.R.D. 148 (D.Mass.
1941).
72. "If one will scratch the surface of the simple language of Rule 14 ... and :?ush
down to the cluster of brain-twisting combinations and variations which lie beneath, he
will find, I believe, a power to perplex nowhere surpassed in the whole body of the Rules."
Poteat, Third-Party Practice Under the New Rules, 25 A.B.A.J. 858 (1939).
73. Professor Sunderland, quoted in Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25
Va.L.Rev. 261, 268 (1939).
74. This is implicit in the language of the Rule itself. In the first sentence of Rule 14
it is stipulated a third-party defendant is a person who is or may be liable to the third-party
plaintiff "for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
75. John N. Price & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 2 F.R.D. 408 (D.N.J. 1942);
Carbola Chemical Co. v. Trundle, 3 F.R.D. 502 (1943).
76. John N. Price & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 75.
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usually be joined as a third-party defendant. Nor does the fact
the plaintiff's claim undergoes a transmutation when restated, and
rests upon a different theory of liability, prevent the rule from be-
coming applicable. In Balcoff v. Teagarden77 a suit was brought
by A against B for infringement of copyright in performing a song
written by A without authority to do so. B impleaded C, who was
A's sister, alleging she had asked him to perform the song and
represented she had authority to permit him to do so. It was held
that a translation of A's claim for copyright infringement into a
claim for damages for breach of warranty of authority by B
against C was perfectly permissible. Similarly, a claim for negli-
gence against a retailer for selling a foodstuff containing a foreign
substance which caused personal injury may become a third-party
claim by the retailer against the wholesaler for breach of contract
of warranty that the food was fit for human consumption.s
7
Since the third-party claim must be based upon the claim of the
plaintiff, the question naturally arises: Does a defendant, by im-
pleading a third-party defendant, admit the validity of the plain-
tiff's claim? The answer is emphatically in the negative. A defendant
may both deny absolutely any liability and at the same time implead
a third-party defendant, claiming a right of reimbursement, indem-
nity, or contribution if he is held liable .7  But it is not grounds
for impleading a third-party defendant that it is contended that
the third-party defendant alone is responsible for the injury of
which the plaintiff complains. The defendant cannot tender an
alternative defendant to the plaintiff against his will, and such a
contention must be raised simply as a defense to the plaintiff's
action8 0
CONTRIBUTION
Rule 14.is procedural. Accordingly, if a right to reimbursement,
indemnity, or contribution does not exist pursuant to substantive
law, Rule 14 will not supply it."t Thus, in a state where the right
77. 36 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
78. Saunders v. Goldstein, 30 F.Supp. 150 (D.C. 1939). But cf. United States v.
Jollimore, 2 F.R.D. 148 (D.Mass. 1941), which seems erroneous.
79. Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741
(1943); Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 29 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.W.Va. 1939).
80. Brady v. Black Diamond Steamship Co., 45 F.Supp. 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1941):
"The defendant cannot implead the third-party defendant on the ground that the third-
party defendant alone, and not the third-party plaintiff, is liable to the plaintiff. This pre-
supposes that plaintiff has sued the wrong defendant, which, properly speaking, is a
defense, as plaintiff cannot recover a judgment against a third-party defendant whom he
has not sued."
81. Bache v. Dixie Ohio Express Co., 8 F.R.D. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1948); Vaughn v.
Guenther, 8 F.R.D. 157 (N.D. Ga. 1948); Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Carbola Chemical Co. v. Trundle, 3 F.R.D.
502 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of contribution exists only among tortfeasors who have been sued
jointly by a plaintiff, a joint tort-feasor who has not been named
as a defendant in the plaintiff's original action cannot be joined
as a third-party defendant -. 8 2 Since the right of contribution be-
tween joint tort-feasors in North Dakota does not depend on the
existence of a joint judgment,8 3 it is plain a joint tort-feasor in this
state may be impleaded as a third-party defendant. Somewhat
less clear under the law of this state, and undoubtedly still to be
resolved by the Court, are two other situations involving contribu-
tions among tort-feasors.
The first of these situations involves employer-employee relation-
ships and may be best illustrated by posing a hypothetical case.
A is employed by C dairy as a helper on a milk truck, the truck
being driven by X, also an employee of C. While making its
normal rounds, the truck is involved in a collision with a vehicle
driven by B. A suffers personal injuries and brings an action for
damages against B in the amount of $100,000. Under Rule 14 (a),
B seeks to implead C dairy as a third-party defendant, alleging
that C's agent X was guilty of negligence in driving the milk
truck and that C should accordingly make contribution to B as a
joint-feasor. C moves to dismiss the third-party complaint on the
ground that under § 65-0108 of the North Dakota Revised Code
(Supp. 1953), the liability of an employer to a workman injured in
the course of his employment arises solely under the terms of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, that C is accordingly not liable
to A in tort, and that a right of contribution therefore does not
exist.
The New York Court of Appeals and the California Supreme
Court have both imposed a liability upon the employer to make
contribution in situations of this sort.84 Despite these impressive
authorities, however, it seems likely that no right to hold the
employer as a third-party defendant exists in this state. The Re-
vised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act85 specifies
82. Brown v. Cranston, note 81 supra; Vaughn v. Guenther, note 81 supra.
83. N.D. Laws 1957, c. 223, § 3 (a).
84. Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corporation, 278 N.Y.
175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938); Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal.2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
Accord, Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Rappa v. Pittston
Stevedoring Corp., 48 F.Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1943). Contra, Kittleson v. American Dist.
Tel. Co., 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D.Iowa 1948); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105
(1940). In Baugh v. Rogers, supra, it was held that the amount of an employer's contribu-
tion to a joint tort-feasor would be reduced by the amount paid to the employee under
the Workmen's Compensation Act for the injury. In Maio v. Fahs, supra, it was held that
the amount of the employer's contribution would be reduced to the amount paid the em-
ployee under the Act.
85. N.D. Laws 1957, c. 223, § 1 (a).
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that the right of contribution exists only where "two 'or more
persons become jointly or severally liable in tort.. ." and the Com-
ment of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws to this section declares that "The language used has
been adequate to exclude cases where the person from whom con-
tribution is sought was not liable to the injured person.""6
The second situation involves liability between husbands and
wives. As previously noted s7 the North Dakota Court has ruled that
a wife may sue a husband, but has left open the question of
whether a husband may sue a wife. Assume that W is driving an
automobile in which H, her husband, is riding as a passenger.
A collision with a vehicle driven by X occurs and H sues X for
personal injuries arising from the accident. Assuming the Court
rules that a husband may sue a wife, X may join W as a third-party
defendant and recover contribution from her if it can be shown
her negligence was a factor contributing to the accident sufficiently
to make her a joint tort-feasor. On the other hand, if the Court
holds that the common law disabilities of coverture have been
removed only from wives and not from husbands, it is clear no
right of contribution would exist."" Presumably the same situation
would exist regarding parent and child, since no local statute
authorizes parent or child to sue the other and no case conferring
such a right has been found.8 9
INDEMNITY
Another question sometimes posed with regard to Rule 14 is
whether an insurance company can be joined as a third-party defen-
dant. On principle the answer would seem to be in the affirmative;
Rule 14 was designed to apply to situations where a defendant has a
right to indemnity from a party not joined in the action, and an
insurance company is plainly an indemnitor.9 ° Moreover, impleader
in such a c'ase is consistent with the purpose of Rule 14, which is to
save time and costs of duplicating evidence, as well as to obtain
consistent results from similar evidence.1 But whether such a
86. See Comment to Section 1 (a), Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (Supp. 1958).
87. See comment to Rule 13, ante pp. 16-17.
88. Schroeder v. Longenecker, 7 F.R.D. 9 (E.D.Mo. 1947); Baltimore Transit Co. v.
State to Use of Schriefer, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 674 (1944). See note 86, supra.
89. See 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 480-84 (1936). Vernier expresses dis-
satisfaction with the rule on the ground it creates "obvious hardship" to an aggrieved
child. Since under a recent statute, N.D. Laws 1957, c. 224, a parent is responsible in an
amount of not more than $300 for any wilful or malicious act of his child resulting "n
the destruction of property, it would seem only just to permit the parent an action over,
in the event the child has assets.
90. Zeigler v. Ryan, 63 S.D. 607, 262 N.W. 200, 202 (1935).
91. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 422 (1950).
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right of impleader exists or not would appear to be immaterial
from the point of view of a plaintiff in most situations, for the
reason that even where the defendant's right to implead his' in-
surer is conceded it is nevertheless the normal result that the
insurer is entitled to a separate hearing under Rule 42 (b) o' as well
as the benefit of the rule excluding mention of insurance in the
presence of the jury.
93
Somewhat more intriguing from a plaintiff's standpoint is the
possibility of joining an insurance company as an outright co-
defendant. The Code of this state provides that "One who indemni-
fies another person against an act to be done by the latter is liable
jointly with the person indemnified and separately to every person
injured by such an act.""4 The precise scope and meaning of this
provision have never been judicially defined in this jurisdiction.
In James v. Young,9 the Supreme Court ruled in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Grimson that the statute permitted joinder of an in-
surance company as a co-defendant in a situation where a taxicab
company had obtained insurance under the terms of a municipal
ordinance requiring such companies to obtain insurance "indemni-
fying those using such taxicab line and the public in general
against loss to person or property." This holding, however, appears
limited to cases of compulsory insurance."
Read literally, of course, the statute would virtually appear to
create a right of direct action against an insurer; and this inter-
pretation has in fact been given to it by at least one court. In
Moore v. Los Angeles Iron & Steel Co.,97 it was held that "the
section . . . makes the policy of assurance inure directly to the
benefit of the injured person, and in addition thereto, allows such
person to proceed against the indemnitor separately, or jointly
with the indemnitee. There is nothing in the section which invites
or allows a narrower construction than the one indicated." ' The
Moore case has, however, enjoyed but little acceptance; the courts
of California, Montana, and South Dakota, where similar statutes
are found, have construed the statute to be merely a restatement
92. Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F.Supp. 413, 416 (D.Md. 1939); 3 Moore's Federal Practice
§ 14.12 (2d ed. 1948).
93. North Dakota cases on this rule include Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d
537 (1951); James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d 692 (1950); Jacobs v. Nelson,
67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873 (1936); Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 N.D. 373, 168 N.W. 791
(1918); and Stephenson v. Steinhauer, 188 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1951). See also N.D.
Rev. Code § 49-1833 (1943), and § 39-1611 (Supp. 1953).
94. N.D. Rev. Code § 22-0206 (1943) (emphasis supplied).
95. 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.WV.2d 692 (1950), 27 N.Dak.L.Rev. 53 (1951).
96. See Note, 20 A.L.R.2d 1097 (1951).
97. 89 Fed. 73 (S.D.Cal. 1898).
98. Id. at 76.
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of a common law rule to the effect that where an indemnitor
specifically requests or demands or requires a specific act to be
done," the indemnitor becomes a joint tort-feasor with the person
doing the act in the event the act proves tortious. 10° As so limited,
the statute would not allow joinder of an insurance company as a
codefendant in those cases where the policy of insurance runs
directly to and is for the benefit of the policy-holder.10 1
Whether the Moore case or the opposing interpretation consti-
tutes the law of this jurisdiction was not settled by James v. Young.
The opinion merely stated that even under the restrictive inter-
pretation of the statute "the right of allowing at least s6me indem-
nitors to be included as defendants with the indemnitees has long
been recognized in our laws."' 02 In practice, however, attempts
to join insurance companies as co-defendants have not often been
made in this state; James v. Young appears to be the only 'case
wherein the question has been considered.
By its terms, Rule 14 is permissive rather than compulsory in
most of its aspects. A defendant is not required to implead a
third-party defendant if he does not wish to do so, a plaintiff need
not set up a claim against a third-party defendant even though
the third-party defendant could have been named a co-defendant
in the original action, and the third-party defendant is under no
obligation to set up any claims be might have as against the
plaintiff, though he is required to set up compulsory counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff. However, where the parties find
99. The classic situation in which an indemnitor is liable jointly with an indemnitee is
where a sheriff, on demand of a plaintiff, attaches or levies execution upon property alleged-
ly belonging to a defendant which in fact belongs to someone else. The plaintiff is normally
obliged to give a bond to indemnify the sheriff against the contingency that the property
involved may not belong to the defendant, and when this occurs the plaintiff is normally
a joint tort-feasor with the sheriff and liable with him in an action of conversibn. See
Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Duarte, 54 Cal.App. 260, 201 Pac. 790 (1921), and cases
cited therein. Compare Ravely v. Isensee, 57 N.D. 286, 221 N.W. 38 (1928).
100. The leading case opposed to the interpretation placed on the statute in the
Moore case, supra, is Northam v. Casualty Co. of America, 177 Fed. 981 (D.Mont. 1909),
in which a right of direct action by the heirs of a workman killed in the course of '-
ployment against the employer's insurer was denied on the ground the statute :nerely
re-enacted the common law rule of liability mentioned in the text. Accord, Severns v. Cali-
fornia Highway Indemnity Exchange, 100 Cal.App. 384, 280 Plac. 213 (1929); Treloar v.
Keil & Hannon, 36 Cal.App. 159, 171 Pac. 823 (1918); Conley v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 98 Mont. 31, 37 P.2d 565 (1934); Cummings v. Reins Copper Co., .10
Mont. 621, 107 Pac. 904 (1910); Zeigler v. Ryan, 63 S.D. 607, 262 N.W. 200 (1935).
But cf. Bryan v. Banks, 98,Cal.App. 748, 277 Pac. 1075 (1929). It is to be noted that
in the Northam case, above, considerable reliance was placed upon a Montana Statute pro-
viding that "The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as
existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as cbntinuations thereof and :ot
as new enactments." No such statute exists in North Dakota, where N.D. Rev. Code
§ 1-0106 (1943) declares that "In this state there is no common law in any case where
the law is declared by the code."
101. Cases cited note 100, supra.
102. James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 460, 43 N.W.2d 692, 698 (1950). On the general
topic of direct action against insurers, see 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 182 (1953).
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it desirable to come to direct grips with one another, Rule 14 con-
tains provisions designed to enable them to do so. The plaintiff
may amend his complaint to state a claim against the third-party
defendant if he wishes to do so, thereby making the third-party
defendant in effect a co-defendant. Equally, the third-party de-
fendant may assert against the plaintiff any claim he possesses
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which constitutes the
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. Where either of these last
two contingencies occur Rule 13 (a) is applicable.
VENUE
There has been substantial disagreement among the federal courts
over the application of venue statutes to third-party proceedings
under Rule 14. The problem may be illustrated as follows: A sues
B a resident of Grand Forks County in the district court of the
First Judicial District. B asserts a right of contribution from C,
a resident of Williston, and accordingly causes a third-party com-
plaint and summons to be served on C at his home. If B's action
were an independent one, it is plain that the venue of the action
against C would lie in the district court of the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict. Does the fact that B is suing C in a third-party proceeding
make the bringing of the action in the First Judicial District proper?
The commentators have split upon this question' and so have
the federal courts.0 4 The most authoritative single decision on the
question in the federal system is probably United States v. Acord, °'
an action for personal injuries in which an impleaded third-party
defendant raised the objection that the venue of the third-party
proceedings was improper as to him. While expressing the thought
that the question was not free from doubt, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that venue in third-party proceedings was to be
determined by the venue of the main action. The Court added,
however, the comment that since the granting of a right to im-
pleader was discretionary with the federal courts, permission to
maintain a third-party proceeding should be denied to a defendant
where "great inconvenience" would be caused to the third-party
defendant? 0'
103. See note 49, Tupra.
104. Among cases holding that venue statutes may be invoked by a third-party defendant
are Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, 29 F.Supp. 112 (D.Conn. 1939);
King v. Shepherd, 26 F.Supp. 357 (W.D.Ark. 1938); Manley v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas,
8 F.R.D. 354 (E.D.Texas 1948). Contra, United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Dickey v. Turner, 49 F.2d 998 (6th Cir.
1931); Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corporations, 29 F.Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y.
1939); cf. Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corporation, 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
105. 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).
106. 209 F.2d at 714.
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It has already been pointed out that the committee which framed
the North Dakota Rules altered Rule 14 to make impleader, a
matter of right in this state. Since the two rules differ on this point,
the North Dakota Court would appear to be free to rule on -he
question without feeling any particular compulsion to follow the
federal precedent. However, two reasons exist for believing. that
the North Dakota Court will eventually arrive at a conclusion
substantially following the Acorddecision: (1) such a result was
reached even prior to the adoption of the new rules in Dillage v:
Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co., 1°7 an impleader case involving a fact
situation analogous to third-party proceedings; (2) a discretionary
power to change the venue of third-party proceedings where "great
inconvenience" would otherwise be caused to a third-party defen-
dant appears to exist under the present venue statutes. °"
One possible exception should be noted, however. As already
mentioned in the discussion of venue in regard to counterclaims,
the syllabus in the extremely recent case of Johnson v. Johnson
0
would appear to suggest that the Court may reach a different result
in the case of the so-called real actions: ejectment, trespass, quiet
title, partition, and mortgage foreclosure. In the Johnson decision
the Court stated that the Code provision laying the venue of these
actions in the county where the land is located pertains to the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter, and neither
acquiescence, personal appearance, nor participation in such an
action when brought in the wrong court will cure the defect.
Although the decision certainly creates an obstacle to the at-
tainment of complete unitary venue in proceedings under the new
rules, it does not necessarily end all prospects of it. Plainly ana-
logous situations arising in the federal courts have not heretofore
prevented those courts from achieving a unitary venue of third-
party proceedings by using the concept of ancillary jurisdiction.
Thus, it has been held that lack of diversity of citizenship will not
107. 54 N.D. 312, 209 N.W. 656 (1926).
108. "The court may change the place of trial . . . (3) When the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. N.D. Rev. Code
§ 28-0407 (1943).
109. Not yet reported. The syllabus, which is the only portion of the case available to
the author as this is written, states: (1) The requirement of § 28-0401, N.D. Rev. Code
(1943) that an action for certain enumerated causes affecting real property must he
brought in the county in which the subject matter of the action or some part thereof f3
situated subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial upon agreement of
counsel or in other cases provided by statute pertains to the jurisdiction of the court :'ather
than the venue of the action and .the court has no jurisdiction of an action which is brought
in a county other than that prescribed by this section. (2) Acquiescence, personal appear-
ance or participation in an action pertaining to real property hrought in the wrong county
in violation of § 28-0401, N.D. Rev. Code (1943) does not confer jurisdiction of the
subject matter upon the court.
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defeat the jurisdiction of a court over third-party proceedings, i.e.,
where A, a citizen of Forum 1, sues B, a citizen of Forum 2, in
the federal district court of Forum 2, B may implead C, also a
citizen of Forum 2, as a third-party defendant without fear of going
beyond the limits of the court's jurisdiction."' Since this is a
situation involving jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
rather than over the subject-matter of the action, precedents of
this type are not squarely applicable to the sort of problem pre-
,sented by the Johnson decision. But the federal courts also extended
the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to deal with the problem of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as well. Thus, in the
federal district courts, where A sues B on the basis of diversity-
of-citizenship jurisdiction, B may join C as a third-party defendant
even though B's claim against C does not involve the requisite
jurisdictional amount to support an independent action. 1 ' And
where jurisdiction in the main action is based on the presence
of a federal question, the right of a defendant to implead a third-
party defendant is not defeated by the fact the third-party claim
involves a non-federal question.'12 This last situation is manifestly
one in which ancillary jurisdiction over third-party proceedings has
been used by the federal courts to cure what would otherwise be
a palpable lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a claim.
Even though the Johnson case thus does not necessarily pre-
determine the result, however, it well may be that the Court may
consider it advisable to maintain the policy of the venue statute
relating to real actions as a matter of judicial administration. It
seems clear enough that under Rule 42 (b) a separate hearing
could be ordered for a third-party claim involving land as its
subject-ihatter; and there seems no reason to doubt that a change
of venue to the county where the land is located could be ordered
under the North Dakota statute if the court felt that the "con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice""' made it desirable.
To sum up: It is to be expected that the court will hold in most
instances that the venue of third-party proceedings is determined
by the venue of the main action. The prospects for this result in
the case of real actions are somewhat less bright but not to be
entirely discounted. There seems no reason why a change of venue
110. Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F.Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Schram v. Roney, 30 F.Supp. 458 (E.D. Mich. 1939); 3 Moore, Federal Practice 496
(2d ed. 1948). Arguing for an opposite result is Willis, Five Years of Federal Third-Party
Practice, 29 Va.L.Rev. 981, 1001 (1943).
111. Schram v. Roney, 30 F.Supp. 458. (E.D. Mich. 1939).
112. 3 Moore's Federal Practice 499 (2d ed. 1948).
113. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0407 (3) (1943).
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as to third-party proceedings should not be ordered in an appropri-
ate case.
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, if the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given .when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the ,original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
114
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be sub-
served thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.11 5
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of the original pleading."'
(d) Supplemental Pleadings.
(1) Upon motion of a party the court may, upon rea-
sonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him
to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions
or occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented, whether or
not the original pleading is defective in its statement of a
114. This follows, with minor changes, the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 14 (a). It super-
sedes N.D. Rev. Code § § 28-0735, 28-0736, 28-0737 and 28-0738 (1943).
115. This supersedes N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0737(4), 28-0732, 28-0744, and 28-0745
(1943).
116. This is identical with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) and supersedes no North Dakota statute.
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claim for relief. If the court deems it advisable that the
adverse party plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the
time therefor.11 7
(2) When during the pendency of an action, a judg-
ment upon the plaintiff's claim is rendered in another action,
the plaintiff, by supplemental complaint, may allege the
recovery of such judgment in aid of his original action and
shall not be required to dismiss such action and commence
a new suit upon such judgment nor shall the recovery of
such judgment constitute any bar to the further prosecution
of such action but such action thereafter shall proceed in
all respects the same as if originally instituted upon such
judgment.1 '
The courts possess the power to permit the amendment of plead-
ings as an inherent attribute regardless of statute.119 Rule 15 is ac-
cordingly no more than a restatement of a power the North Dakota
courts would possess in any event. A tradition of liberality in allow-
ing amendments is well established in the state, -' and this rule
plainly continues it. Prior North Dakota precedents involving amend-
ments would therefor appear to retain a very considerable authority.
It is clear under those precedents that the allowance of an amend-
ment (excluding, of course, the case where an amendment is made
as of right tinder the terms of the Rule) will remain substantially
a matter within the discretion of the court, though the discretion is,
it goes virtually without saying, a judicial rather than an arbitrary
discretion. 12
It will be noted that Rule 15 relates entirely to amendments
of the pleadings. It does not govern the amendment of process,
which is permitted under the terms of Rule 4 (h).' 2 2 Nor does it
govern situations where a pleader desires to change the name of
117. This follows Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) and supersedes N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0719 (1943).
118. This is new material not found in the Federal Rules and continues the rule of
N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0727. (1943) without change.
119. Morgridge & Merrick v. Stoeffer, 14 N.D. 430, 104 N.W. 1112 (1905); Leach
v. Nelson, 48 N.D. 1046, 189 N.W. 251 (1922).
120. So far is the policy carried that under some conditions a pleading may actually be
amended in the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Patterson Land Co. v. Lynn, 44 N.D. 25,
175 N.W. 211 (1919). This result was reached in a ease involving trial de novo on appeal.
See Morris, A Memorandum on Appellate Practice, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 219, 222 (1953).
Holding that great liberality is allowed as to amendment of pleadings are Holler v. Amodt,
31 N.D. 11, 153 N.W. 465 (1915); Sheimo v. Norqual, 31 N.D. 343, 153 N.W. 470
(1915); Kurtz v. Paulson, 33 N.D. 400, 157 N.W. 305 (1916). "An amendment should
be allowed if in the interests of justice add (if) it does not change substantially the
claim or defense." Northwestens Mut. Say. & L. Ass'n v. White, 31 N.D. 348, 359, 153
N.W. 972, 974 (1915).
121. For a statement of considerations to be considered by the court in the exercise
of its discretion, see Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 209, 217,
202 N.W. 404, 407 (1924).
122. See the discussion of Rule 4, 32 N.Dak.L.Rev. 101 et seq. (1956).
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a party,1 2' or by amendment to add or drop a party to an action.
12 14
Proper practice under the Rule is undoubtedly indicated by the
case of Satterlund v. Beal, -12 " an early case in which the Court laid
it down that when a party has received permission to amend a
pleading, the pleading must be actually rewritten, so that as amend-
ed it constitutes a complete instrument. The normal consequence
of the practice, sometimes followed, of making a motion for leave
to amend and upon the granting of the motion thereafter treating
the pleading as actu'ally having been amended, is to cause the
abandonment of the amendment. 12-' But this is not always true;
the adverse party, by acquiescing in this procedure and failing
to insist upon the actual redrawing of the instrument, may be
d'eemed to have waived the error. -1 2 7 Where a complaint is amended
there is no need to serve a new note of issue or notice of trial .1s
Of interest in connection with the subject of amendments is the
case of LaPlante v. Implement Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
"'29
which declares that the making of a pre-trial order does not deprive
the court of its discretion to allow or disallow amendments to
the pleadings. One question posed by that decision deserves
special mention. Suppose a court, in a pre-trial order, permits or
disallows an amendment of a pleading which involves the merits
of the action? Under the LaPlante holding it would seem the order
could not be appealed; but in Hermes v. Markham3o the Court
stated specifically that if a proposed amended answer raises a
defense involving the merits of the action, the order denying it
is appealable.'
123. N.D.R.Civ.P. 9 (h). See Ulledalen v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 74 N.D.
589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946) (a party plaintiff may be added by amendment); Derek v.
Elder, 63 N.D. 635, 249 N.W. 724 (1933) (a party defendant cannot be substituted
after trial for the person actually sued, e.g., where plaintiff sued defendant as an individual
plaintiff could not during the course of the trial amend his complaint to substitute a
corporation of which defendant was president as the party defendant against which relief
was sought); Hart v. Rigler, 70 N.D. 407, 295 N.W. 308 (1940) (where A sued 13
Hide and Fur Company, which made a general appearance, A could amend to show that
R, an individual doing business under the name of B Hide and Fur Company, was the
real party defendant).
124. This is covered by Rules 13 (h) and 21. See cases cited in note 123, supra.
125. 12 N.D. 122, 95 N'W. 518 (1903).
126. Satterlund v. Beal, 12 N.D. 122, 95 N.W. 518 (1903).
127. Jacobson v. Forbragd, 42 N.D. 1, 171 N.W. 624 (1919).
128. Kerr v. Grand Forks, 15 N.D. 294, 107 N.W. 197 (1906). See N.D.R.Civ.P.
40 (b).
129. 73 N.D. 159, 12 N.W.2d 630 (1944).
130. 78 N.D. .268, 49 N.W.2d 239 (1951). Accord, LaDuke v. E. W. Wylie Co.,
77 N.D. 592, 44 N.W.2d 204 (1950); Stimson v. Stimson, 30 N.D. 78, 152 N.W. 132
(1915); Bolton v. Donovan, 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W. 357 (1900).
131. When does an order "involve the merits of the action"? It has been said that
'the statute governing appealability, N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2702 (1943), "impliedly contains
a distinction between those orders which affect a substantive right of the parties to an
action, and those orders which affect a right which is merely procedural in character."
Note, 28 N.Dak.L.Rev. 186, 199 (1952). The former class of orders involves the merits
and is appealable; the latter are not appealable.
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RULE 16. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE; FORMULATING ISSUES
In any action after issue is joined, the court in its discretion
may, and upon written request of a party shall, direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference
in advance of trial to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to
a master for findings to be used as evidence when the
trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at
the conference, the amendments'allowed to the pleadings, and
the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such
order when entered controls the subsequent course of action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The
court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar
on which actions may be placed for consideration as above
provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or
to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions. Upon failure of
counsel to appear, the court shall have authority to grant a
motion for dismissal or to proceed with the conference, as may
be appropriate."' 2
A. General Comment. - Rule 16 deals with a subject matter
familiar to the practitioner in this state, since the federal practice
as to pre-trial conferences was incorporated into the procedure
of this state when the Revised Code of 1943 wag enacted.'2 3 Practice
in the North Dakota district courts has been explored with great
thoroughness by Chief Justice GrImson in the NORTH DAKOTA
LAW REVIEW several years ago' and reference should be made
to that discussion for an indication of what may be expected in
the various district courts. Another excellent discussion is Kincaid,
A Judge's Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955),
which summarizes the results of much experience in the federal
courts.
132. This is derived from Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 without substantial change and continues
the provisions of N.D. Rev. Code c. 28-11 (1943) with only minor alterations mentioned
in the text.
133. N.D. Rev. Code c. 28-11 (1943).
134. Grimson, A Progress Report on Pre-Trial Conferences in North Dakota, 30
N.Dak.L.Rev. 85 (1954).
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Rule 16 does not differ in any substantial degree from its pre-
decessor statute in the ReVised Code of 1943. It does, however,
omit a requirement formerly found that a copy of the petition for
a pre-trial conference and a notice of the time of the conference
be served upon opposing counsel at least ten days prior to the
conference."3' The logical procedure probably is to treat a request
for a pre-trial conference as the equivalent of a motion under
Rule 6 (d) thus entitling the adverse party to at least five days
notice. There are, in addition, differences in the matters which
are listed for consideration by the court. These are appended in
the margin.1 6 In view of the thoroughly flexible procedure cus-
tomarily employed in proceedings under Rule 16, it is not be-
lieved that these variations in language should lead to any. sub-
stantial variations in results.
A pre-trial order issued under the terms of Rule 16 is not ap-
pealable. 13 It should be noted, as well, that a pre-trial order may
sometimes have greater breadth than the practitioner expects.
Thus, in Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 188 the action of a court
in rendering summary judgment against both a plaintiff's claim
and a defendant's second counterclaim was held to be merely a
pre-trial order, and hence non-appealable, where the defendant's
first counterclaim remained yet to be tried.
Rule 16 also has an important bearing on the question of taxation
of costs. Costs which could reasonably have been avoided by
appropriate action at a pre-trial conference may not be taxed
to a losing party in the federal courts. 1 9 While N.D.R.Civ.P. 54 (e)
declares that costs and disbursements "shall be allowed as provided
by statute," it would appear highly probable that the federal rule
in this matter will be applicable in this jurisdiction. 4 '
135. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1103 (1943).
136. Thus, the code provision, N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1101 (1943) listed among matters
to be considered "In personal injury cases, the arrangement for physical examination of
either the plaintiff or defendant if required, a stipulation of maps or charts of the location
involved and such other facts as measurements, widths of streets, distances, dates, time,
and weather conditions." This does not appear in Rule 16, but is plainly comprehended
by the language of Rule 16 (6). Equally, the provision of Rule 16 (5) did not appear
in the Code.
137. LaPlante v. Implement Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 73 N.D. 159, 12
N.W.2d 630 (1944). For discussion of appealability, see Note, 28 N.Dak.L.Rev. 186
(1952).
138. 136 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943). See N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(d).
139. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 966 (1950).
140. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2606 (1943) provides that the clerk must tax "as a part
of the judgment in favor of the prevailing party his disbursements as follows: (2) The
necessary expenses of taking depositions and of procuring evidence necessarily used or
obtained for use on the trial . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
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